How Vendor Access Vault compares
Password managers store secrets. Secrets managers ship them to servers. Neither one asks whether this person should be seeing this credential right now.
Most tools answer where is the credential?
We answer who can open it, who approved that, when does it expire, and who has looked at it?
Pick the comparison that matches your setup
- vs 1PasswordThe unit of access is a whole vault. A guest gets all of it, and keeps it until an admin remembers to take it away.
- vs BitwardenThe unit of access is a collection. Their own contractor guidance asks a named human to remember to revoke it, and the event log starts on a paid tier.
- vs LastPassLastPass's own documentation tells admins not to rely on some activity-log events as audit evidence. Opening a secure note is on that list.
- vs DashlaneFor anyone outside your company, the answer is a link that dies after one view or 24 hours, whose expiry you cannot change and which you cannot revoke once sent.
The gap every one of them leaves
Password managers were built so a person can find their own login. Secrets managers were built so a server can fetch a key. Both do their job well, and neither was designed for the thing that actually bites you: an outside person needing temporary access to your credential.
So teams improvise. They add the contractor to a shared vault, and that vault becomes a permanent, unmonitored key to everything in it. Nobody approved it. Nothing expires. Nobody can say who opened what.
That is the gap we were built for: request, approve, auto-expire, audit. Every credential sits behind an approval, every grant has a timer, and every reveal is written to an append-only log with the actor, the IP, and the user agent.
Credentials that expire on their own
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